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Judicial Notice:
IlTe Vert Texture of Leqal t easoninq
Susan G. Drummond
The doctrine, of judicial notice is philosophically intriguing in its own
right and exciting because of the new ground that it is breaking in
Canadian law. It also happens to be a confusing and confused part of the
law. The doctrine seems to careen between saying something so obvious
that it says nothing at all and threatening some of the very foundations of
legal orthodoxy. Some of the ambiguity in the doctrine is caused by a
wider epistemological disorder.
Another difficulty in getting a grasp on it is that the manner in
which it is construed as ideologically-charged. It seems to either subtly
promote judicial activism or counsel judicial restraint. One version of the
doctrine locates the intelligibility and legitimacy of law close to the heart
of the political community; another prizes law for its ability to remain
politically transparent by virtue of its prior fidelity to a venerable
professional tradition. Deeper commitments seem to be at stake, ones
that are incommensurable with each other, calling for articles of faith
where the bedrock of justifications has been reached. Without further
justification, the doctrine is placed in very distinct spots in legal theory,
turning up in some obscure and rarely visited corner, or confronting us
face on as one of the central entrances to a understanding of law.
Significant and far-reaching consequences flow from the scope and place
that the doctrine is given in the legal order. What I hope to do here is to
eliminate some of the incoherencies in the doctrine in order to allow it to
operate with greater incisiveness.
Recently the doctrine of judicial notice has been advancing onto the
ground of family law. In an obiter in Moge v. Moge, Madame Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 remarked that on the basis of a weighty corpus of
social scientific research into the feminization of poverty "the general
economic impact of divorce on women is a phenomenon, the existence of
which cannot reasonably be questioned and should be amenable to
judicial notice."' The case puts considerable emphasis on compensation
as an objective of spousal support alongside the other three objectives of
' Moge v. Moge (1992), 43, RFL (3d) 345 [hereinafter Moge].
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the Divorce Act2, significantly narrowing the scope of an antecedent
jurisprudence that placed inordinate emphasis on the promotion of
economic self-sufficiency following divorce. By virtue of this latter
emphasis in statutory interpretation, couples were encouraged to
extricate themselves from their former spouses, financially and
emotionally, as soon as possible. Moge, on the other hand, recognizes the
complex and enduring economic disadvantages suffered by spouses
(principally wives) due to the distribution of childcare responsibilities
and domestic services and as such it has been celebrated as ushering in a
new model of spousal support. It has disconcerted those who had come
to take for granted the fit-for-tat of the self-sufficiency model, the 'fish
or cut bait' response to women's demand for equality. It is not clear what
role the doctrine of judicial notice played in turning the tide, nor what
role it could play. Part of this uncertainty comes from ambiguities in the
doctrine itself, and it is to an elucidation of these issues that I will now
turn.
What is judicial notice ?
Thayer, one of the first systematic writers on the subject, places the
subject of judicial notice at the very beginning of his treatise on
evidence as the first chapter. Not only does it occupy this first principles
place in his doctrine, its scope is much wider than the law of evidence,
undergirding it. "Where about in the law does the doctrine of judicial
notice belong?" Thayer asked in 1900.
Wherever the process of reasoning has a place, and that is
everywhere. Not peculiarly in the law of evidence. It
does, indeed, find in the region of evidence a frequent and
conspicuous application; but the habit of regarding this
topic as a mere title in the law of evidence obscures the
true conception of both subjects. That habit is quite
modem. ... The subject of judicial notice... belongs to the
general topic of legal or judicial reasoning. It is, indeed,
woven into the very texture of the judicial function. In
conducting a process of judicial reasoning, as of other
2 Spousal support should give effect to the three objectives of spousal support orders
defined in s. 15(6) and s" 17(7) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2"d Supp.) c. 3,
which are to:
a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the
marriage or its breakdown ;
b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of
any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of
the marriage;
c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of each
spouse within a reasonable period of time.
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reasoning, not a step can be taken without assuming
something which has not been proved; and the capacity to
do this, with competent judgment and efficiency, is
imputed to judges and juries as part of their necessary
mental outfit.3
Judicial notice is omnipresent in the law for Thayer. It is backed by
the common sense and ordinary experience that judges bring to the
courtroom. It is, in part, comprised of unproven background elements
without which not a step of proof on the foreground can be taken.
Judicial notice embodies what everybody knows, and what every good
judge knows: ordinary usages and practices of courts, general principles
and rules of the law of the court's jurisdiction, ordinary meaning and the
use of vernacular language, the ordinary data of human experience, local
knowledge, the, ordinary habits of human beings... . The judge is
presumed to be: endowed with this sense that is commonly held, is
obliged to so endow herself if there is a pertinent lacuna. On this view of
the doctrine, the judge is active and inquisitive. She has a large discretion
to judicially notice and has an obligation to inform herself independently
of the adversaries of litigation.
Because the judge figures positively in this process, is obliged and
presumed to take it upon herself to incorporate the sense that is
commonly held, and proffers an authoritative understanding of it, the
exercise of judicial notice is open to scrutiny. On Thayer's understanding
of the doctrine, taking judicial notice does not imply that the matter is
indisputable. Tentatively, the noticed fact raises prima facie evidence of
the fact. It is presumed by the judge until there is a reason to think
otherwise. It can-be countered by one of the parties to the dispute. It can
be countered on appeal. It can be countered in subsequent cases where
any of the parties can meet the prima facie evidence that masqueraded as
common sense by presenting their reasons for thinking otherwise. And it
can be countered by changes in or alternate understandings of common
sense that plead against prior assertions. On Thayer's approach, the judge
is a bold and active presence, and yet, in virtue of the openness of
judicially noticed facts to dispute, also a tentative and limited authority.
Writing half a century later, Morgan radically narrowed the scope
and application of the doctrine.4 In part he did so by delimiting it
negatively. Front and centre for Morgan was the adversarial system and
the rules of evidence that shore it up. Each party to a dispute presents
evidence to support his or her version of the facts and the court in general
j. Thayer, A Selection of Cases on Evidence at the Common Law (Mass: Charles W.
Server & Co., 1982) at 19-20.
4 E. J. Morgan, "Judicial Notice" (1944) 57 Harvard Law Review 269-94.
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the rules of evidence that shore it up. Each party to a dispute presents
evidence to support his or her version of the facts and the court in general
acts as an impartial arbiter to hear and determine the issues. The court
has no machinery for discovering, without the aid of the parties, matters
of fact that are disputable and disputed, nor is an independent
investigation into the disputed facts by the court permitted. The trier of
fact has no duty and no license to discover the truth of disputed facts,
retaining only the obligation to decide what the facts most credibly
appear to be as disclosed in the material submitted - such as it is.
The doctrine of judicial notice is an exception to these principles of
evidence. Whereas the judge is normally transparent in matters of fact, a
neutral medium for the evidential laws that govern the process, the judge
takes on a fleeting human presence in facts judicially noticed. The
purpose of this momentary presence in the adversarial traffic of facts is
to swoop down and scoop irrelevant facts out of the arena of dispute so
as to minimize the presentation of moot issues and foreclose the claim or
defense of false issues, thus expediting the process. The irrelevancy of
this particular order of facts arises in virtue of the fact that no reasonable
person could hold them in dispute. The range of matters which are
amenable to judicial notice are propositions, legal and extra-legal, which
are so probably true as to be notoriously indisputable amongst reasonable
men. The judge, as the arbiter of what is notoriously indisputable among
reasonable people, immunizes these facts from proof or disproof by
formal evidence in taking judicial notice. This immunization does not
operate as a presumption. It is a manoeuvre that forecloses further
evidence. The judge operates, in this case, as a virtually unlimited
authority with limitations imposed only from within the legal hierarchy.
Judicial notice can only be contested on appeal and invalidated if it can
be demonstrated that the criteria for the application of judicial notice
were not present (the fact was not notorious, the sources to establish the
fact were not indisputable...). As judicially noticed matters operate in the
domain of fact, not law, they have no precedential value. Judicial notice
and stare decisis perform wholly distinct functions in law.
This is a slightly caricatural presentation of the two extremes of the
doctrine of judicial notice:
i) judicial notice as the disputable background to law,
including the law of evidence - a tentative depiction of
the firmament illuminating the law;
vs
ii) judicial notice as the very intermittent demonstration of
judicial authority - an exceptional departure from the
principled search for truth through proof.
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Since Morgan, the doctrine has gone through a series of elaborations
pulled back and forth between either of the epistemological poles that
these two versions stake out. While, according to legal commentators,5
conventional wisdom in Canadian law has tended to favour Morgan's
narrow reading of the doctrine, there is a parallel trend that has
recuperated Thayer and fine-tuned his analysis. This trend appears to be
in the ascendancy at the moment and is changing both the social and
legal meaning of the doctrine.
Reliance upon L'Heureux-Dub6's comments in Moge have given
the Thayer model something akin to, if not identical to, precedential
status as a statement of current Canadian law. Family court judges in the
wake of Moge have been using Moge precedentially as good legal
authority for recognizing the feminization of poverty as a background
fact for spousal support determinations.6 This kind of precedent operates
at two levels. Concretely, Moge is good legal authority for a change in
the way that spousal support is viewed. But a precedent is also being set
for a shift in the doctrine of judicial notice. The case is turning out to be
good legal authority for a more general proposition. If the feminization
of poverty, a matter of fact, is now treated as something that does not
need to be formally proved but is taken to have made its prima facie case
in Moge, then the case and the use being made of it is simultaneously
endorsing the view that judicially noticed facts are pulled out of the
domain of fact and into the domain of law. It looks like a new precedent
about judicial notice is emerging in the common law, overtaking the old
model.
As well, not a few of the subsequent cases are treating the virtually
noticed fact of the feminization of poverty in Moge as a legal
presumption, amenable to dispute by the parties.7 This emerging practice
of treating judicially noticed facts as prima facie evidence goes against
the grain of legal commentators such as Sopinka and Schiff, two
Canadian authorities on evidence, who hold it to be conventional wisdom
in Canadian law that it is in the nature of judge-initiated noticed facts
that they are radically removed from the formal proceedings!
Paradoxically, the manner in which this transformation of conventional
5 See J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) [hereinafter Sopinkal ; S. Schiff, Evidence in the
Litigation Process, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993); Report of the Federal/Provincial
Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence (prepared for the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada) (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) [hereinafter "Federal/Provincial Task Force"].
6 L. H. Wolfson, D.S. Melamed & S.J. Morris, "The Use of Judicial Notice in the Wake
of Moge v. Moge" (1994) 11 Canadian Family Law Quart. 159, which provides an
extensive list of related judicially notices facts in family law in the wake of Moge.
See appendix B, ibid.
" Supra note 5.
6 Susan G. Drummond
legal wisdom is taking place seems to add justification to the model of
judicial notice that Thayer, and now L'Heureux-Dubd, are promoting,
whereby the judge (Supreme Court Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in this case)
is an active, inquisitive presence of tentative authority whose claims are
eligible to be limited by the parties to a dispute by rebuttal evidence,
limited by the legal hierarchy through appellate investigations into the
appropriate use of criteria, limited by subsequent case by case responses
to the prima facie assertion of common sense, and open to limitation by
changes in or an alternative understanding of common sense pleaded
against prior assertions. This is the Thayer model of judicial notice in
action, justifying itself, showing that the doctrine belongs to the general
topic of legal or judicial reasoning and is woven into the very texture of
the judicial function.
This subliminal re-writing of the doctrine of judicial notice has been
facilitated by doctrinal shifts which have qualified and requalified the
Morgan doctrine, which entered into law almost verbatim in the United
States in the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence drafted by Morgan. It does so in a manner that brings it back,
half a century later, to Thayer. L'Heureux-Dubd recapitulates this
evolution in her legal commentary on judicial notice subsequent to the
Moge obiter called 'Re-examining the Doctrine of Judicial Notice in the
Family Law Context' 9 - an article that both puts out a tentative claim
about the doctrine of judicial notice and which also happens to stand as
an equally authoritative source on the law of judicial notice as the
doctrinal writers whom she cites therein as authoritative on the question.
It stands as good authority until good reasons are advanced to throw it
into question. It both tells us about the place of judicial notice and
simultaneously shows us how it works.
The first significant qualification of the Morgan doctrine came with
Davis' 1955 article0 on judicial notice. His recharacterizations of
Morgan have been taken up as seminal by contemporary writers on the
subject, and by courts in the United States and Canada. What is almost
universally accepted now is the distinction he makes between
adjudicative and legislative facts. In the matter of adjudicative facts,
Davis is in agreement with Morgan about the appropriate attitude of the
judge. Adjudicative facts are those facts that are personal to the
immediate parties before the court. They relate to their actions, their
activities, their possessions, involving determinations of 'who did what,
where, when, how, and with what motive or intent'." Determinations on
9 C. L'Heureux-Dubd, "Re-examining the Doctrine of Judicial Notice in the Family
Law" (1994) 26 Ottawa Law Rev. 551 [ hereinafter L'Heureux-Dubf].
'0 K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice" (1955) 55 Columbia Law Review 945 [hereinafter
Davis].
"32B Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Rules of Evidence § 32.
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these questions should be treated by the parties through formal methods
of proof. With this order of fact, independent judicial investigation is
inappropriate. The judge is properly passive with regard to these facts,
active only with regard to the proper disposition of the law in regard to
process and substance.
Legislative facts, however, do not invite the same treatment.
Legislative facts are those that aid the court in determining the content of
the rules which they are mandated to apply. They are general
propositions, not only affecting the particular parties before the court but
having ramifications on the interests of future litigants.
While it is accepted that legislative facts are established outside of
the formal tableau of proofs, it is the exact content of legislative facts
that is undetermined. Davis' scope is very wide indeed and close to
Thayer's broad understanding of legal reasoning itself. Legislative facts
are those "which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and
policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what
course of action to take."1 2 The law is a creative process in this model,
the judge charged with roaming far and wide in the wise execution of his
or her creative duty, and judicial notice structured so as to facilitate the
process. As aids to judicial law-making, legislative facts include social
and economic facts as well as propositions about the applicable law in
the jurisdiction. Davis, like Thayer, includes what I shall call, after
Wittgenstein, "form of life" matters in the category of social facts which
are legislative. By "form of life" I mean the structure of reasoning in a
given community that lends determinations on the foreground their
second-nature - their naturalness - as well as their sense of limits and
sense of the transgression of limits. Thayer called these elements those
that are 'woven into the very texture of the judicial function'. This is how
Davis describes these "form of life" facts:
A human being is probably unable to consider a problem -
whether of fact, law policy, judgment, or discretion -
without using his past experience, much of which may be
factual and much highly disputable. ... Judge and
administrative officers should make their policy choices on
the basis of all relevant facts, even though the kind of facts
that usually influence policy choices are often too elusive to
be captured and penned up within a formal record. The
wisdom we seek in judges and in administrative officers is
made up of multifarious ingredients that often defy
identification and usually defy separation from other
ingredients - knowledge of specific facts, understanding of
1" Davis, supra note 10 at 952.
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general facts, prior experience in trying to solve similar
problems, mental processes such as logic or reasoning and
mental processes such as appraising or estimating or
guessing, formulation and application of notions of policy,
imagination, inventiveness and intuition, emotional reactions
and emotional control.
13
While the Canada Evidence Act 4 narrows legislative facts to recognition
of legislation and common law in effect in the jurisdiction, the aborted
1970s Evidence Code of the Canada Law Reform Commission's Report
on Evidence and the aborted 1980s Uniform Evidence Act took pains to
broaden the scope again to approach Davis' standard. Both reform
proposals seek to include in the domain of legislative fact those elusive
"multifarious ingredients that often defy identification and usually defy
separation from other ingredients." In their comments on the Evidence
Code, the Law Reform Commission seeks to include by illustration a
range of background facts not requiring proof. So, for example,
.. when a witness testifies that he observed a car in a lot,
the judge or jury will necessarily associate an object with
the word "car", even though no evidence was introduced as
to its meaning. Evidence would not normally be offered at a
trial to prove the proposition that a car travelling eighty
miles per hour cannot stop within a distance of ten feet; that
a horse is a four-legged animal; that a gun is a dangerous
weapon; or that the sun does not shine at midnight in
Ottawa. It would consume an endless amount of time if all
these facts had to be independently proved. Therefore, the
parties are entitled to assume that the trier of fact, be he
judge or juror, will bring his common sense and experience
to bear in reasoning about the evidence presented. 5
In these comments, it is important to notice that the Law Reform
Commission is drawing attention to an implicit process of familiar
recognition that happens all the time and that keeps the evidential quest
in line. These are matters that are not in question in the trial process.
They are taken-for-granted. I will also argue that it is grammatically
incorrect to say that these are things that "everybody knows" or that they
are "facts" or "assumptions" but rather that these are things that are
understood. I will also argue that something hangs on this rather
quibbling distinction that I am drawing.
" Ibid. at 949.
14 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
1S Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa : Canada Law Reform Commission, 1975) at
103.
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The Task Force report on the Uniform Code of Evidence similarly
recommends that judicial notice be expanded to legislative facts which
have this "form of life" quality to them. The reporters were of the
unanimous view that "the terminology of 'legislative' fact is neither well
known nor well understood" and that the concept "related not so much to
facts that have to be proven as to the mental context in which the judge
views the case. Legislative facts may be thought of as social facts which
constitute the fund of knowledge the judge has and upon which he must
draw in determining the case." Echoing Thayer they note that the concept
"is part of judicial reasoning rather than of evidence."
This "form of life" understanding of legislative facts also strikes a
chord with L'Heureux-Dub6 who, in citing Sopinka's description of
judicial notice, places greatest emphasis on the notion that "tacit judicial
notice ... surely occurs in every hearing [and is] indispensable to the
normal reasoning process."1 6 In her own words, these fundamental facts
"comprise a prism of personal experience and understanding through
which judges and jurors, as factfinders, both perceive and interpret that
which is put before them."'
17
This understanding of legislative facts as including "forms of life"
has implications for what exactly the procedure is for taking judicial
notice. There is often an obfuscation in the way that the phrase is used. In
the event that judicial notice is taken at the request of one of the parties,
there is less room for confusion. Ideally, pursuant to the request, the
judge should hear arguments or evidence before taking notice of a
matter. Once notice is taken, no further evidence can be tendered on that
issue at trial.
The more interesting, and confused, case is what it means for a
judge to take judicial notice on his or her own initiative. It is here that
there is a grammatical obfuscation between an explicit and an implicit
procedure. Correct procedure hinges very much on which view one takes
about the matters that are amenable to notice. On the one hand, it seems
patently obvious that, for the doctrine to be actually doing something, the
judge must notify the parties that notice is being taken of some matter
and must specify precisely what that matter is. Delisle goes further and
characterizes the necessity for this openness as a matter of natural
justice.1 8 Certainly the provisions of Morgan's Model Code allow no
exception to the requirement that the parties be given advance
notification of intent to take judicial notice. This seems all the more
reasonable given that, on the narrow reading of the doctrine, judicially
1 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 9 at 559.
17 Ibid.
IS R. J. Delisle, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 3' ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1993) at
259.
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noticed facts are only inconclusive on appeal. Surely if the appeal is to
have a ground for examining the propriety of that which has been
judicially noticed, then there must be no doubts about whether judicial
notice took place or not. And yet, it is not at all clear that this is always
what is meant by "taking judicial notice".
There is a use of the phrase "to take judicial notice" that occurs over
and over again in the literature and that is consistent with the
understanding that the procedure can be implicit. Indeed the process
could be subliminal. The judge, let alone the parties, may even be utterly
unaware that they are taking notice. Thayer suggests that this is what is
happening when he remarks that "... in conducting a process of judicial
reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without
assuming something that has not been proved."' 9 But these unproved
assumptions that guide the process of judicial reasoning are not, each and
every one of them at every turn of mind, everpresent before the mind's
eye. And yet, they are part of the omnipresent legal reasoning that
Thayer includes as part of judicial notice.
Davis takes this analysis further and underlines that this implicit
process is, in large measure, exactly what he means by the procedure of
taking judicial notice and he underlines that it in fact is what happens in
court all the time. Rather remarkably, he suggests a modification to the
Model Code along the following lines:
Because all thinking by judges and by officers about
questions of fact and law, policy and discretion necessarily
involves the assumption of many facts that have not been
proved, perhaps ninety-nine out of a hundred extra-record
facts are so obvious that no one would conceivably want to
challenge them. Therefore, the necessary and proper
procedure is for the judge or the officer to go ahead and
notice them, without even mentioning that assumptions are
made about the meaning of the word "the", that water runs
downhill, or that the United States has a government. 20
The reading of what it means to "take judicial notice" that construes
it as most commonly an implicit process is by no means a marginal or
antiquated take on the meaning of the words. The Provincial/Federal
Task Force on the Uniform Code of Evidence remarks that "... often the
doctrine of judicial notice takes hold tacitly rather than explicitly."
2'
They cite Nokes as saying that "in many cases no reference is made
during the trial to [judicial notice] founded on common knowledge; if the
'9 Thayer cited in Davis, supra note 10 at 949.
20 Davis, supra note 10 at 978.
2, "Federal/Provincial Task Force", supra note 5 at 45.
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fact is relevant, everyone in court will assume that rain falls, for
example; and there is no ascertainable limit to the matters that are thus
silently noticed by both judge and jury."22 And L'Heureux-Dub, in her
1994 article, incorporates Davis' approach into her argument by citing
his comment that background facts "are frequently 'noticed' despite the
absence of pertinent evidence in an invisible process by which a judge or
juror relies upon "beliefs" ... which he reasonably thinks he shares with
other intelligent persons as to the general nature of things... Judicial ...
notice of background facts is pervasive, occurring 'inconspicuously and
interstitially' as an inevitable part of the adjudicative decision making
process.23 She emphasizes that it is more uncommon that these
background facts get flushed to the surface of awareness, more common
that they remain in the interstices of thought and understanding.
Both the Davis/Thayer and the Morgan doctrine are in agreement
that the discretionary power of the judge to take judicial notice is subject
to appeal by reviewing courts. But the implications of Davis' thesis about
procedure are really quite remarkable at the appeal level, especially when
consideration is given to the recent emphasis on making legislative facts
matters of law and hence appropriate questions for both precedent and
an appeal tribunal, a development in the law to which I will return. If we
imagine that what the judge simply takes for granted are actually
implicitly noticed legislative facts, then a new ground for appeal opens
up. There is, on this thesis, an opening to contest, at the appeal level,
those taken-for-granted forms of life that can be shown to have had an
impact on the inference-drawing process.
One could argue at the appeal level that what was taken as a form of
general legal reasoning was in fact a reflection of one particular legal
sensibility. One could argue that a judge took something to be a universal
feature of human reasoning when in fact it merely reflects a local
understanding. One could argue that a judge has not determined matters
in accord with the sense that is commonly held, that is, the sense of the
relevant local community. One could argue that the judge took
insufficient notice of the way that local history or geography or culture or
common sense is in contention with his or her common sense. One could
argue these and related things at the appeal level even though the judge
never acknowledged - nor may indeed have been aware - that these
were the background assumptions which enabled him or her to come to a
determination on the foreground.
22 Ibid. at 45-6.
23 L'Heureux-Dub, supra note 9 at 558-59.
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This critical drift into particularizing the sensibilities of judges and
opening that sensibility up for review finds support in L'Heureux-Dub6's
article in which she points out that
[t]hese fundamental facts comprise a prism of personal
experience and understanding through which judges and
jurors, as factfinders, both perceive and interpret that which
is put before them. Not all factfinders, however, will
perceive the same circumstances in the same way.
Moreover, while the prism held by most factfinders may
constitute a perfectly adequate analytical framework in
most situations, in certain contexts it may not accord with
reality, and may therefore impede rather than advance the
quest to find facts in a way that is reflective of how people
really experience the world.24
Delisle specifies some of the more notorious 'prisms' which get
judicially noticed when he remarks that "we need to recognize that
"common sense and experience," judicially noticed, and hence relevance,
may vary depending on the judges' culture, gender, background,
education, social origin and age." 25 On Davis' model, all of these
implicitly noticed matters of agreement in judgment are challengeable on
appeal on demonstration that the shared background that gives rise to a
particular inference at trial is not universally shared, the judgment
therefore suspect.
As I indicated above, the implications on the appeal process of the
Davis/Thayer view that judges can and do 'take judicial notice'
implicitly are consolidated by recent developments on Davis' seminal
distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. The most
interesting elaboration on the Davis distinction comes from recent work
by American writers Monahan and Walker who are cited favourably and
at length by L'Heureux-Dub6 in her article on judicial notice in the
domain of family law. Their work primarily deals with the incorporation
of social science research into the litigation process but I shall focus on
their remarks about the precedential status of this material once it is
judicially noticed.
Monahan and Walker promote a new paradigm to fine-tune Davis's
legislative/adjudicative fact distinction. They propose a tripartite schema:
social authority, social framework, and social facts. The third category,
"social facts", effectively overlaps with "adjudicative facts" as those
facts used to resolve a dispute specific to the proceedings between
24 Ibid. at 559.
25 Delisle, supra note 18 at 258.
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16particular parties. Social authority overlaps with Davis' "legislative
facts", and "social framework" is a hybrid of the two.
The social authority category includes social science research that
relates to the judicial lawmaking process. It is comprised of empirical
propositions of a general nature which go to the social authority
underlying a rule of law applicable to many parties.27 Social framework
facts, on the other hand, are those empirical propositions offering general
research results as a context or frame of reference to assist the court in
deciding specific factual questions. Included in the latter category would
be the social science research into battered women's syndrome or the
findings of research on the feminization of poverty where research is not
specifically commissioned for the particular parties to a dispute but
rather inferences are drawn about the particular parties on the basis of the
off-the-rack research.
For the purposes of this discussion, what is interesting is that
Monahan and Walker propose that both social framework facts and
social authority facts be granted precedential authority and form the basis
of law. Social authority facts take on this precedential status as prima
facie evidence. Even unsupported empirical assertions, if otherwise
plausible, can be treated like rules of law. Empirical judgments remain
provisional. Courts incorporate these judgements as good law, while
remaining attentive to changes not in judge-made or statutory law, but in
empirical evidence. Changes in empirical findings would compel a
reconsideration of what, until then, had stood as law, with no
requirement for olympian efforts to distinguish it.
Judicial notice, in this case, is not different from stare decisis in
respect of noticed facts being incorporated into the common law and
guiding future cases in requiring departures to be justified. But there is a
way in which this view of judicially noticed facts departs from the
doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis not only puts future parties on
notice of the law, it simultaneously serves to consolidate the integrity of
the legal system and constrains the manoeuverability of future courts.
The leading case for treating social scientific material as adjudicative or social fact is
Processed Plastic v. Warner Communications, 675 F. 2nd
, 852 (7th Circuit, 1982) in
which the plaintiff adduced empirical testing on market responses to that particular car
design in question to prove that trademark had been infringed. See L. Walker & J.
Monahan, "Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law" (1987) 73 Va.
L. Rev. 562 [hereinafter Walker & Monahan].
27 Walker and Monahan cite the leading case of Unites States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897
(1984) which decided whether good faith violations of police search warrants violated
the fourth amendment where social scientific proof was adduced to show statistically
that in fact police did not take license to abuse due process when courts did not
overturn good faith failures to comply with the requisite process for search and seizure
warrants. Ibid. at 562.
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This understanding of judicial notice loosens up those constraints, or
rather hands them over to a different order of constraint. An empirical
argument could overturn a legal precedent without making reference to
statute or jurisprudence but could directly reproach a prior empirical
finding. It is tempting to say in this case that the integrity of the legal
order would be maintained less by reason of authority than by authority
of reason, where reason, in this case, is social scientific. Construing this
as a move from the constraint of tradition to the constraint of reason is
misconceived, however, because all forms of reasoning are imbedded in
traditions and legal traditions are woven through with, and supported by,
their own particular forms of reasoning. I will return to this point. It
might be more accurate to say that on this model of judicial notice the
constraints on law move from the forms of reasoning traditionally used
in law to the forms of reasoning familiar to other human enterprises.
That this order of judicially noticed facts - what Monahan and
Walker call social authority facts - take on the status of precedent is not
particularly novel. Sopinka and Lederman remark that "the fact that a
certain fact or matter has been noted by a judge of the same court in a
previous matter has precedential value' 28 and advise counsel and court,
therefore, to examine the case law record to avoid proving acknowledged
facts. More adventurous are the arguments of Monahan and Walker to
establish the precedential status of social framework facts in order to by-
pass the timely and costly process of re-proving these general social
science findings anew at each case. This would widen the scope of those
facts elevated to law through the process of judicial notice.
The argument that they present to justify the elevation of these facts
to law through judicial notice operates via an analogy between the
doctrine of common law precedent and the manner in which social
scientific material is made authoritative. The criteria courts should use in
determining whether to notice a social scientific fact would be virtually
the same criteria internal to the scientific community in elevating certain
social scientific material to seminal and authoritative status and
disregarding other material as unreliable and unpersuasive. This process
in the social scientific community happens to mimic, they remark, the
process whereby certain cases are certified as reliable and persuasive in
the legal community. Thus they argue that:
[jiust as a case reviewed by a court high in the appellate
structure has more weight as precedent than an unreviewed
lower court opinion, so the degree to which a researcher's
work has been subject to the critical review of his or her
peers in the scientific community is an important index of
the trustworthiness of the results. The publication of
28Sopinka, supra note 5 at 977.
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research in journals with independent scientific editorial
boards, for example, is one way to ensure that some such
reiiew has taken place.
The extent to which courts will accord a decision
precedential value depends not only on the level of court
that issued it, but also on the quality of reasoning revealed
in the opinion itself. Decisions viewed as "well reasoned"
are more likely to be taken as authoritative than are
decisions in which the inferential links between the
principles invoked and the holding reached are difficult to
discern or are logically flawed. In the context of social
science research, a well reasoned study is one that
possesses "validity". To have "high" validity, a study must
rule out (or control for) competing hypotheses that may
account for an observed state of affairs. Social scientists
design their studies to minimize factors that could
compromise validity and make the results of the research
equivocal or "poorly reasoned".29
These criteria - whether the research has been tested by extensive peer
review, whether valid methods were employed, how it falls within a
substantial line of pertinent inquiries - should be used by the judge to
determine whether the empirical propositions should be noticed.
This list of criteria should resonate with those who are familiar with
Alisdair Maclntyre's concept of a practice. And it is here that I return to
my point above about forms of reasoning and what makes certain reasons
authoritative. Maclntyre defines a practice as
any coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the
result that human power to achieve excellence and human
conceptions of the ends and good involved, are
systematically extended. 30
Maclntyre's remarks about standards of truth being internal to the
practice is also resonant with the tests which Monahan and Walker are
promoting in limiting law's quest for truth through the evidential process
and expanding other forms of reasoning. Monahan and Walker argue that
social framework material should be given the status of a legal rule
2 Walker & Monahan, supra note 26 at 589-90.
30 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue : A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 187.
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through judicial notice. This legally authoritative status should be
reversible by the presentation of new empirical research that upsets the
expectations established by the earlier research and has been weighed in
the crucible of social science practice. This is a plea that other forms of
human excellence take their place in law and that sources other than the
narrow, self-replicating traditions of legal inquiry be considered as
authoritative in law. The manner in which they have articulated their plea
does not suggest a rock hard universal epistemological foundation for
determining which facts should be elevated to law. Rather they adopt a
community standard approach which takes its measure of excellence -
what Maclntyre calls 'Internal goods' - from within the socially
established cooperative human activity at issue. This measure of
excellence, as Maclntyre points out, is only "identified and recognized
by the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who
lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal
goods."'" Monahan and Walker's suggestion is to delegate the
adjudicative process in these matters to those who have mastered the
relevant rules and experiences through diligent participation in the
practice.
The Walker and Monahan proposal, then, extends the body of
judges competent to adjudicate particular disputes beyond the legal
profession. They do this in a manner that does not just hand the matter
over to experts. The test that they have set up for social framework
matters to qualify for judicial notice - peer review, validity, location
within a substantial line of inquiry - is more like handing a measure of
the adjudicative process over to the communities in which the experts
excel. The individual expert has no authority to make authoritative
statements independent of the community in which he was formed.
Again, Maclntyre speaks well to this point. He says :
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience
to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a
practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is
to subject my own attitudes, choices preference and tastes
to the standards which currently and partially define the
practice. Practices of course, as I have just noted, have
history : games, sciences and arts all have histories. Thus
the standards are not themselves immune from criticism,
but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice
without accepting the authority of the best standards
realized so far.32
3' Ibid. at 188-89.
32 Ibid. at 190.
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The expert is not a self-made person and nor can she be a self-proclaimed
expert. The authority of her reasons comes from obedience to standards
external to her. Having originally accepted the inadequacy of his or her
performance as judged by those community standards, he or she may
excel and generate, through diligence, devotion, or even sheer brilliance,
one of those formulations which become the best standards realized so
far. In that event the expert will speak superlatively for the community,
not for him or herself.
The experts to whom Monahan and Walker would extend the
adjudicative role are non-elected representatives of a community. They
do not always compel because they represent a consensus or even a
majority in the community. The qualifications of the experts are not
democratic in that sense. Not infrequently peer review recognizes them
because they have subverted the conventional pieties of the community
and re-written the historically accepted standards of excellence internal
to the community. Having been long obedient to the sense of the
community, the expert pushes the limits of the sense that is commonly
held, sometimes transforming it. Not infrequently they are at the
forefront in artfully reformulating some of the community's most
contentious issues. In this they are not unlike judges.
Monahan and Walker do not only extend the adjudicative role to
non-legal experts and their communities, they also see a much more
active role for the judge than the impartial and passive observer of the
factual world that Morgan envisaged. The underlying assumption of their
argument is that courts should treat social science facts in the same
manner that they treat legal precedent. One court's conclusions about a
social framework should affect the judgments of later courts just as one
court's conclusions about a matter of law affect later courts. In the event
that there is a jury, the judge should manage social framework material in
the same way that the law is communicated to the jury - by instruction
that they are to apply the social framework given by the court to the
facts. But just as it is the responsibility of the court, rather than the jury,
to evaluate case precedent, so Monahan and Walker assert, it is the
responsibility of the court, rather than the jury, to evaluate social science
research. The view supporting independent judicial investigations into
those background facts amenable to judicial notice is consistent with the
accepted practice that courts are free to carry out their own search for
legal authority not signaled by the parties. As social framework and
social authority are matters of law on this doctrine of judicial notice,
judges should be free to do their own investigations to locate relevant
social science studies. Indeed standards of practice impose an obligation
upon judges to familiarize themselves with the relevant law, and this
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elevation of social science research to matters of law intimates that the
standards of excellence by which judges are judged impose an obligation
to be well-informed and intellectually adventurous over a diverse range
of interdisciplinary standards of excellence.
This picture of judicial activism is consistent with Davis' emphatic
view of the judge as law-maker in need of a broad range of legislative
facts to help determine law and policy. And L'Heureux-Dub6's remarks
are consistent with this same tradition of judicial activism. She notes:
One of the more significant aspects of Davis's recognition
of legislative facts is his implicit acceptance that agencies
and judges, in deciding questions of law or policy,
essentially perform an active law and policymaking role
rather than passively recognizing or discovering law that is
dictated by precedent or principle. Although this
observation has long been recognized as "conventional
wisdom" in the United States, only recently has it begun to
take on a similarly irrefutable character amongst Canadian
courts and commentators. The way in which the role of the
court is perceived can in turn, very much affect the way in
which the doctrine of judicial notice is conceptualized. The
more courts acknowledge their active contribution to
lawmaking, the greater becomes both their duty and their
need to lay bare the policy assumptions upon which their
decisions are based.33
The doctrine promoted by Thayer, Davis, Monahan and Walker, and
most recently by L'Heureux-Dub6 counterbalances the non democratic
authority of judges to make rules of law through judicial notice by an
openness to dispute which the Morgan doctrine does not recognize.
The Morgan judge acquires authority through the constitution and
that authority is virtually complete on matters of judicial notice which are
indisputable except through review by the constitutionally authorized
appellate court. According to Morgan, the common law is not open to
change as new social authorities and new social meanings bearing on the
assumptions constituting judicially noticed facts become available. It is
open to change through changes in legislation which courts are called
upon to apply and masterly shows the finesse of the standards of
excellence internal to the legal community.
The Thayer judge, on the other hand, has limited authority
susceptible to review by changing community standards that overtake the
basis on which judicial notice was granted. As prima facie evidence,
judicially noticed facts stand as good law only until good reasons can be
advanced to review them and these good reasons arise from the better
13 L'Heureux-Dub, supra note 9 at 558.
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judgement of the community best placed to assess them. The common
law is open to challenge by multiple communities generating new and
compelling standards of excellence that the judge is professionally
committed to recognizing.
Some of these communities will be recent and volatile, with
rapidly expanding standards, the community marked more by arguments
about membership and about what constitutes the object around which
they are grouped in common activity. The social sciences might be a
good example of this form of life which, despite its high level of
reflexivity and debate about methodology, can identify standard bearers
equipped to articulate the most pressing issues and those settled matters
which are understood to be well-established. Some communities may be
stable for long periods around a complex set of traditions which are so
well incorporated by practitioners that they are taken-for-granted and
questioned only at the periphery. The physical sciences or Roman
Catholic canon law might qualify here. The legal community, at different
moments in its long history and on different parameters probably careens
between this intense reflexivity over object and methodology that vexes
the most astute practitioners, and the community of understanding that
poses those settled doctrine that only a neophyte or an eccentric risk their
credibility by questioning.
The doctrine of judicial notice is one of those axes about which
other settled doctrines spin. The phrases commonly used to fix its
contemporary meaning are usually akin to something like "conventional
wisdom". Equivalent phrases also abound. Thus Sopinka remarks that:
There has been a lively debate among text writers as to
whether a fact which is judicially noticed forecloses any
evidence on the point. Some cases support the view that a
judicially noted fact raises a factual presumption of prima
facie evidence of the fact. On principle, however, it seems
that judicial notice is intended to dispense with evidence,
assuming the criteria of its application are present. "This
appears to be the modem view." [emphasis added]34
That an expert such as Sopinka declares that something appears to be the
modem view adds considerable weight to what the modem view appears
to be. Thus the task force on the Uniform Rules of Evidence remarked
that "Academic commentators now appear to agree that judicial notice
should be given conclusive effect., 35 L'Heureux-Dubd, on the other
hand, surely as qualified an expert as Sopinka and as well positioned to
Sopinka, supra note 5 at 986.
3s "Federal/Provincial Task Force", supra note 5 at 43.
20 Susan G. Drummond
discern what appears to be the modern view, indicates in her comments
cited above that "conventional wisdom in the United States has long
recognized the active law and policymaking role of judges and that this
view has begun to take on a similarly irrefutable character amongst
Canadian courts and commentators. '"36 The conventional American
wisdom is supported by legal commentators such as Walker and
Monahan whose view it is that judicially noticed matters form prima
facie evidence that is open to dispute.
Before discussing which doctrine of judicial notice has become
authoritative in Canadian Law, I want to return to an unfinished
discussion from above. This is the distinction that I drew between those
things which "everybody knows" and things that are understood. If this
underlying epistemological difference can be clarified for things that are
susceptible to judicial notice, then I believe we should have a clearer
understanding about which doctrine of judicial notice has been judicially
noticed.
Knowledge and understanding
There are phrases commonly used regarding judicial notice which, I will
argue, are grammatically incorrect. They are accompanied by a set of
examples that contribute to this grammatical confusion. The most
emblematic of those grammatical errors is the phrase "that which
everybody knows". The examples given by the Canada Law Reform
Commission are typical of the epistemological confusion that I am
talking about where they refer, in the passage cited above, to the
meaning of the word "car", the fact that a horse is a four- legged animal,
the fact that the gun is a dangerous weapon, and the fact that the sun does
not shine at midnight in Ottawa. Thayer and Davis are also guilty of this
confusion when they talk about those unproven assumptions upon which
proof is predicate. In their examples, they too use examples like the
meaning of ordinary words, that water runs downhill, or that the United
States has a government. There are many other doctrinal writers prey to
this obfuscation, but the Thayer/Davis thesis appears to be the most
vulnerable.
I will argue that to call these things "assumptions" is grammatically
incorrect just as it is incorrect to say that we "know" them. I will also
argue that the way that many of the examples are used indicates that it is
incorrect to call those matters "facts" and also incorrect to claim that we
"know" them. This grammatical confusion, by my reckoning, is the
greatest weakness of the Thayer/Davis doctrine; a weakness that almost
renders senseless the notion of tacit judicial notice - a wheel turning
L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 9 at 558.
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idly. I believe, however, that their doctrine can be rescued with an
alternative epistemological understanding which leaves in place the
notion of implicit judicial notice and even keeps in place many of the
examples used to illustrate the understanding.
This revision, I will try and show, yields fairly compelling
guidelines for two scenarios when judicially noticed matters should be
made open to review and dispute: i) scenarios in which the very structure
of legal reasoning can be shown to be biased and ii) scenarios in which
special circumstances plead against common sense. This analysis should
also give further fuel to the contention that judicially noticed matters
should be treated as prime facie evidence amenable to dispute. 7 The first
guideline to come out of this modification of the Thayer/Davis doctrine
for when judicially noticed matter should be made explicit is on appeal
from implicitly noticed matters. The second is at moments when
common sense is in fact in dispute.
The clearest diagnosis of the epistemological disorder to which
Thayer and Davis are vulnerable comes from Wittgenstein's work On
Certainty to which he devoted his attentions at about the same time that
Davis was writing in the 1950s. His thinking is a response to G.E.
Moore's famous claims that he knew for certain a number of propositions
such as "Here is one hand and here is another" and "the earth existed for
a long time before my birth" and "I have never been far from the earth's
surface". Moore claimed that this rock hard base of certainty served as
the foundation for the claim that the external world existed and hence as
an answer to the radical skeptic that Descartes raised in the tradition of
Western philosophy. The gist of Wittgenstein's argument is that Moore
was wrong in thinking that he knew the propositions at all: not because
the propositions were false but because the claim to knowledge of them
was senseless. He was wrong to claim that he knew them because of the
grammar of words such as "know" and "doubt". But the radical skeptic,
Wittgenstein claimed, also misunderstood the nature of doubt,
knowledge and certainty. Moore was senselessly answering a question
from the radical sceptic that could not sensibly be asked.
Wittgenstein's arguments about Cartesian doubt are directly related
to his arguments about Moorish certainty. Doubting, he remarks, itself
presupposes certainty. He remarks "If you are not certain of any fact, you
cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either." "I don't know if
this is a hand" presupposes that I know what the word 'hand' means.38
The following arguments should be taken to arise against a component of what
Monahan and Walker have called "social authority" facts; I take it that their arguments
and procedural proposals are compelling for what they have called social framework
facts.
3 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (New York: Harper, 1969).
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Cartesian doubt undermines itself since it is so radical that it is bound to
call into doubt the very meaning of the words used to express it. If the
evil genius is deceiving me about everything, then I am being deceived
about the word 'deceive'. Cartesian doubt thus refutes itself. To say that
one is doubting in this case is to use the word incorrectly. It functions as
nothing more than the verbal utterance of doubt.
The idea that one can be correct or incorrect in using the word doubt
suggests that it is not the lone self confronted with an evil genius that
could determine the matters susceptible to doubt or to knowledge. The
correct use of the word is something that people learn. And in learning
when doubts are appropriate and when they are not, the neophyte must
begin by accepting certain things as true, taking them for granted in their
attempt to discern the areas where questions are pertinent. This also
suggests that intelligible doubts presuppose the mastery of practice. It is
the practice, what Wittgenstein would call a "form of life", which sets
the parameters of intelligible doubts - when doubts are meaningful and
when they are without sense. Doubts about the whole "form of life" are
not meaningful as doubting is only intelligible within the parameters of
taken-for-granted sensibility into which neophytes are formed.
Testing, then presupposes things which are not tested. So, for
example, "If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the
apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not about that. If I
do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the
paper aren't switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory
the whole time, and trust it without any reservation." And here,
Wittgenstein makes an empirical observation about reasonable and
unreasonable doubts. To doubt all of our calculations is a mark of
craziness, not error. "If someone said to me that he doubted whether he
had a body, I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn't know what
it would mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I had said
something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or
why.' '39 The procedure of talking someone out of a mad belief - or, for
that matter, of a mad doubt - is quite different from that of correcting a
mistake. Reasons can be given for a mistake, but only causes for a mental
disturbance.
Wittgenstein then turns these observations about doubting toward
Moore's claims to knowledge. He asks whether it is possible to doubt the
things that Moore claims to know and asserts that there is, in general, no
intelligible meaning to the expression "I doubt that this is my hand." It
would be like the behavior of someone who checked to see that his
calculations did not shift on the page when he was not looking. "If
Moore were to announce the opposite of his propositions," Wittgenstein
'9 Ibid. at § 257.
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points out, "we should think him demented, not mistaken." But if it is not
possible to doubt something, to be mistaken in believing it, to inform
oneself about it, then one cannot be said to know it. This is part of the
way that the word "know" functions in grammar, a grammar that we
learned and are not capable of unilaterally modifying. "I cannot possibly
doubt that I was never in the stratosphere. Does that make me know it?"
Wittgenstein asks rhetorically. Does it make it true?" 4 Claims to
knowledge of this type are idle. They say nothing at all, though we are
tempted to attribute sense to them because they share the same
grammatical structure of utterances that, in different context, do make
sense. The reasonable man does not have certain doubts, but neither does
he make certain claims to knowledge: only someone uninitiated, mad or
otherwise unhinged - someone doing philosophy - could be heard to
be making claims to knowledge which spin idly within human
communities.
That does not mean that instances cannot arise nor be imagined
when some of these propositions might be meaningfully uttered. But
those would only be in very special circumstances. One could imagine a
context in which it might make sense to say "I know that a car travelling
eighty miles per hour cannot stop within a distance of ten feet." If car
manufacturers were at some point in the future, to start designing cars the
best of which, could bring a car travelling eighty miles an hour to a full
stop in a distance of ten feet five inches in ideal conditions, an expert
with extensive knowledge of the most advanced standards in the industry
might intelligibly be heard to say "Standard braking distance has been
revolutionized in the last several years but I know for a fact that a car
traveling eighty miles per hour cannot stop within a distance of ten feet."
.At a stretch, one could even imagine a context in which it is intelligible
to say "I know that guns are dangerous weapons." Imagine, for example,
one was amongst a remote people who had never had direct experience
with guns but who watched American movies ranging from Star Wars
and Star Trek to Rambo and assumed that guns were like the fantastical
swords that Darth Vadar wielded - artifacts of the Hollywood
imagination - until an American adventurer visited them and corrected
them about guns. If the people had been under this mistaken impression
for a long time, naively delighted by the imagery even, they might turn to
a second American adventurer with their skepticism and then she might
intelligibly state "Yes I understand that you believe that guns are fictions
of the American imagination, but I know for a fact that guns are
dangerous weapons." Here might be a case where such a claim makes
sense. But these are very specific and unusual circumstances. It is hard to
40ibid. at § 222.
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imagine any kind of a general context in which the claim to such
knowledge makes sense, precisely because it is difficult to imagine any
general kind of context in which grounds would be present to doubt. The
mental exercise of searching for special circumstances is even more
difficult for claims to knowledge like "I know the horse is a four-legged
animal" or "I know that the sun in Ottawa does not shine at midnight."
There are at least two observations to make about the senselessness
of doubting or claiming to know that, for example, the sun does not shine
in Ottawa at midnight. The first is that there are a range of doubts which
would be considered hollow, not the sign of someone who was being
shrewdly cautious, but of someone who had not yet learned, or had not
learned properly, what it means to doubt. Wittgenstein asks us to image a
pupil who will not let anything be explained to him because he
continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of
things, the meaning of words, etc.. The teacher says to him "Stop
interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don't make sense
at all."" The doubts of the student are hollow. This is one kind of general
doubt that might be uttered about the sun in Ottawa. A student who
constantly interrupted his history lessons with doubts as to whether the
earth really existed would be raising doubts that are not germane to the
discipline of history. If he continues to raise these hollow doubts despite
the discipline of the teacher, he will not be capable of settling long
enough to acquire the practice. Such a student might eventually be dealt
with as a discipline problem. If he acquires elements of the discipline of
history but remains unable to make the fine discernments about which
doubts open up fruitful lines of inquiry, and boisterously continues to
raise inappropriate doubts, he will likely be regarded as a loose cannon.
Motives and causes will be sought for the behavior that distracts so much
attention from the quest for discerning grounds for doubt. If a party were
to come to court raising these kinds of doubts at every turn, either a
motive would be sought (for example, obstruction of justice) or she
would be disciplined, like the student who constantly interrupts, as she
clearly does not grasp, nor want to grasp, procedure in a court of law.
There is another possibility about things like the possibility of the
sun shining at midnight in Ottawa or centipede horses related to the
discipline of the courtroom. These are special circumstance doubts that
evoke Hilary Putnam's possible worlds experiments. Putnam, in an early
analysis from which he has since retreated, attempted to maintain the
hypotheses that the natural world had essential elements which scientists
discover and which, like Moore's metaphysical certainty arising from
immediate sense data, should serve as a foundation for certifying our
more ordinary beliefs. He imagined what would happen if a scientist
41 Ibid. at § 310.
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developed a new test and discovered that, for example, a large part of
what we have been calling 'gold' in fact turned out to have the chemical
composition of fool's gold. We would not, he claimed (and probably
with reason) say that true gold, it turns out, also has the chemical
composition of fool's gold. We would say that much of what we had been
calling gold up until that point in fact turns out to be fool's gold - and
the price of gold would go up. The chemical composition of pure gold is
- or has become - to a very large extent, determinative of what we
mean by the word "gold"; is "of the essence" of gold.
Putnam then went on to imagine a world where another planet was
discovered on which there was a substance that looked like water, that
people from earth could drink and bath in, that fell from clouds and filled
lakes and ponds, froze at 0°C and boiled at 100°C, that had all of the
properties with which we are familiar here on earth and behaved in the
same manner as what we call water - even when transported in large
quantities to earth. Suppose that after years and years of calling this
substance "water" scientists discovered that in fact it had the chemical
composition K20 rather than HO. Putnam claimed, on the same model
as the fool's gold example, that we would (and should) defer to the
experts and say "we have always thought that substance from the other
planet to be water but now we know that it is not". But on this example,
it is not clear that we would defer to expert scientific opinion. We might
just as easily say: "we have always thought that the chemical
composition of water was HO, but now we know that water has various
chemical compositions". There are some words whose meaning is so
tightly wound up with common language and ordinary experience that
we do not privilege experts to determine what they really are. For some
words, the determination by experts is, or has come to be, such an
integral part of their meaning that we defer. Gold might be an example.
But for other common and familiar words and objects we do not. Hence
if a geneticist were to declare to have found that what we have been
calling centipedes in fact had the exact genetic characteristics of what we
have been calling horses, we would not now call horses four-legged
animals and hundred-legged insects; we would say that we have
discovered centipedes with the exact genetic characteristics of horses.
Genetic science would be revolutionized by such a discovery before
ordinary usage would. Common usage and meaning would prevail.
Science is a specialized discipline, like history, and both are predicate
upon the scientist and the historian having first mastered ordinary
language and the common sense and ordinary experiences that they share
with us. The mastery of these specialized crafts depends upon the prior
mastery of a common language. These kinds of doubts, like doubts about
the existence of the earth, would be excluded from procedure in a court
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of law because for the doubts to be reasonably raised, the speaker must
already have taken for granted a world of shared meanings that, if thrown
into doubt, would simultaneously throw into doubt the entire enterprise
of science or history.
It should now be easier to recognize the grammatical errors to which
Thayer and Davis seem vulnerable. The view they promote of the taken-
for granted background of evidence law's foreground of proofs is
susceptible to the same critique of G.E. Moore's foundationalism that
Wittgenstein mounted. When they claim that judicial notice is taken of
those unproven assumptions upon which proof is predicate such as the
ordinary meaning of words and the fact that rain runs downhill, there is a
sense in which they are saying something akin to "I know this is a hand."
The idea that these are assumptions constantly being made through some
unconscious mental process, like William James' stream of
consciousness, is as misguided as Moore's contention that he was saying
something intelligible when he uttered his famous words. It would be
incoherent to say, in the process of a trial, that, for the purpose of this
dispute, I shall assume that the words of the English language have not
changed since yesterday, or I shall assume that the court building has not
been moved by spacemen to France subjecting proceedings to that
jurisdiction's rules of evidence or I am assuming, for the purposes of this
trial, that all of the parties to the proceedings are not robots created as
part of a technological experiment by a secret joint academy of science
and law. This would be as unintelligible as a mathematician who said
"For the purposes of making this calculation I shall assume that the
figures do not shift about on the page." The notion of an assumption in
mathematics functions more like this: For the purpose of this calculation,
I will assume that theorem X is valid. It would be close to impossible to
imagine what would constitute proof against the proposition that
numbers shifted on the page or that the English language was susceptible
to change overnight or that spaceships might move courthouses into
different jurisdictions. It does not make sense to say that judges are
constantly taking judicial notice of an infinity of taken-for-granted,
undoubtable things. It does not make sense to claim that judges know or
are perpetually assuming these things if it does not make sense to raise
doubts against them. The idea of "taking judicial notice" is idle if this is
what Thayer and Davis mean by it. It does no work at all. Like Moore,
they would be wrong in thinking that a judicially noticing judge is
assuming all of these things, not because the assumptions are false but
because the claim that they are assumptions is grammatically incorrect.
This argument might appear to be decisive against the Thayer/Davis
doctrine. I do not believe that it is. It can be rescued in two ways. The
second takes the direction of recognizing that special circumstances can
arise in which it makes sense to doubt common sense. The first revision
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is to reformulate their view of things which "everybody knows" or
"reasonable people assume" to read rather as things which are
understood. These are what I have preferred to call "forms of life"
matters or agreements in judgment or agreements in understanding rather
than unproven facts or propositions or assumptions. And a compelling
reason exists for preserving the Thayer/Davis doctrine of implicit judicial
notice, one that the Moge recognition of the feminization of poverty
would find congenial.
The first revision to the Thayer/Davis doctrine is to shift from
talking about "knowledge" or "assumptions" and to talk, instead, about
understanding or agreements in judgment. These are things that are
susceptible to what I have called "form of life" judicial notice. There is a
way of construing this category of "things which are taken-for-granted"
which does, and should, turn wheels in the legal machinery. It begs for
the continuation of the notion of tacit judicial notice, both as recognition
that some form of "taking judicial notice" happens implicitly and as a
recognition that, contrary to Delisle's claim, the demand for explicit
procedure does not always operate in the service of natural justice.42
Ignoring the scope of "form of life" judicial notice would foreclose
critically important appeals from things which the judge simply, and
unjustly, took-for-granted. And Wittgenstein pointed out a way to
articulate this concern.
Moore thought that he had found a foundation on which to refute the
sceptic's doubt about the existence of the external world. He was
searching for a kind of super-certainty or metaphysical certainty.
Wittgenstein argued that his thoughts were delusional. He borrowed the
concept from contexts in which the words "I know X" are meaningful
and used them in a context where they were not. He was merely uttering
the same words without their having a sense. But Wittgenstein makes
another point that is very close to Moore's foundationalism, but not
quite. He remarks: "I should like to say: Moore does not know what he
asserts he knows, but it standsfastfor him, as also for me; regarding it as
absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry. '' When he
asserts that some things are solid, this sounds like a foundationalist
statement. And in a sense it approaches one. Yet these are not things that
are amenable to either doubt or knowledge. Rather they are the things
that formed part of the background of the learning process. They are not
exactly foundational, however, because it is conceivable that another
people, for example, might not have taken precisely the same things for
granted as they inculcated their young into practices and beliefs and it is
42 Supra note 19.
43 Wittgenstein, supra note 38 at § 151 [emphasis added].
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also possible that these things are only foundational for human beings
living in the kind of world in which we live. It is possible, for example,
that a people exists who groundlessly believe, just as groundlessly as we
believe the contrary, that things disappear into thin air. We could
elaborate a picture of a community that incorporated this understanding
into all of their transactions and relationships. Regarding these matters as
absolutely solid and commonsensical should not be amenable to proof or
disproof as they constitute part of the very method of doubt and enquiry.
"That is to say," Wittgenstein remarks, "the question that we raise and
our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn." 4 The solidity of
these matters arises from similarities in training rather than similarities in
opinion.
But that does not necessarily mean that these background matters
are utterly and always exempt from doubt. The hinges about which
opinions and assumptions turn may not be the same hinges for people
who do not share similarities in training. While a court may be taking
judicial notice implicitly of these taken-for-granted matters that
constitute our form of life, may be precluded from even recognizing their
artificiality and the fact that they arise from similarities in training, and
may indeed take them as elements of the natural world, an outsider to the
practice may quickly recognize how arbitrary and conventional those
beliefs actually are. Cultures only appear from the point of view of an
outsider. From the inside, they are simply the way that things are done.
As Bourdieu remarks, "Every established order tends to produce the
naturalization of its own arbitrariness." 45 It is this misrecognition of its
own arbitrariness - the inability of participants to perceive their
sensibilities as one possible tradition among others - that gives
participants their sense of reality. And it is precisely this arbitrarily
entrenched sense of reality - the hinge upon which turn the questions
we raise and upon which our doubts depend - that are susceptible to
tyrannizing someone raised with different experiences and in a different
tradition. It is for this reason that the Thayer/Davis doctrine of implicit
judicial notice and its implications for appeal as well as the concomitant
openness of judicial notice to dispute as prima facie evidence, are worth
preserving, for they keep open the possibility of recourse from the
tyranny of one group's common sense.
"Form of life" judicial notice functions in these cases to shift the
field of that which will be amenable to doubt, to knowledge, to belief,
and to opinion. As Bourdieu remarks "opinion ... [is] one of the different
44lbid. at § 341.
45 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977) at 164 [hereinafter Bourdieu].
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and equally legitimate answers which can be given to an explicit
question." This domain of opinion and argument would be a good place
to locate Monahan and Walker's social framework facts which are open
to research, new evidence, scientific criteria of proof. It would be fair to
say that social framework facts are based on assumptions. There is,
however, a line drawn between the field of opinion - of that which is
explicitly questioned - and the field of doxa (as Bourdieu calls it) -
that which is beyond question, which goes without saying because it
comes without saying, which each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact
of acting in accord with social convention. "Form of life" judicial notice
takes the latter for granted in setting constraints on the range of
legitimate answers or credible opinions. Drawing attention to the
arbitrariness of the form of life attempts to move, if only incrementally
and over time, different things into the naturalized background. Drawing
attention to the misrecognition of arbitrariness thereby shifts the range of
legitimate and credible opinion onto the foreground.
It is important to note here that this is not a matter of changing
people's assumptions and entering new facts or propositions into those
things that "everybody knows" - or at least not only a matter of this. It
is more a matter of shifting the underlying agreements in judgment about
what will constitute legitimate opinions and answers and doubts and
those things, like madness or loose cannon behavior, that we do not seek
to modify by presenting reasons for or against as we would for a mistake,
but for which we look for causes and motives. Judicial notice in these
cases looks more like matters of judgment than like matters of fact.
This challenge to the established order's sense of reality is not
unlike one of the ways in which the judicial notice of the feminization of
poverty operates. It seeks to establish a new orthodoxy, recognizing that
prior understandings of the unremunerated gift economy of the family
were hinged upon things that go without saying because they come
without saying, those things "which each agent tacitly accords by the
mere fact of acting in accord with social convention." 47 Judicial notice of
the feminization of poverty in determining spousal support orders
exposes the arbitrariness of the taken-for-granted, in this case that
women's labour in the home is appropriate behavior - appropriate to
womanhood. Childcare and domestic labour take on their social
meanings and values from a domain of tenderness wholly
incommensurable with market values and considerations which, in turn,
flow from a domain wholly incommensurable with considerations of
tenderness.
46 Ibid at 168.
47 Ibid. at 169.
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It did not escape Davis that judicial notice is often a matter of
judgment. Indeed it is this quality which inspired him to claim that
judicially noticed matters should be open to dispute. In reflecting on a
case in which the court relied upon a common sense of reality for its
holding he asks:
Was the court right in speaking of "the plainest facts of our
national life"? Or was what the Court called "facts" in
truth judgment? Or was it a mixture of facts and judgment
- an interpretation of facts? ... The answer to these
questions probably is that the observations were factual but
were inseparably mixed with judgment, that the mixture of
facts and of judgment was by no means indisputable, and
that judges cannot think without constantly using such
mixtures of facts and of judgment, even though the
mixtures are often far from indisputable."
Bedrock has been reached in these cases where what is in issue are forms
of life. We reach the end of giving reasons because these are the
background things with which we reason, the hinges upon which turn the
questions that we raise and upon which our doubts depend. There is
nothing, or not very much, that can be said to convince someone who
does not share a similarity in training with us. We say at this point "this
is what we do".
The notion of discipline discussed above in regard to someone who
kept interrupting a history lesson with doubts as to whether the earth
really existed is apt. The teacher does not "know" the earth exists, nor
"assumes" it, nor can even be correctly said to "believe" it. An idly
doubting student would be disciplined because in order to learn the
practice, she must first be obedient and accept the authority of standards
and the inadequacy of her own performance as judged by them. Because
these are things not, in general, amenable to "doubt" and therefore not
amenable to "knowledge", they are not facts. They are judgments,
grounded in similarities in training.
This type of judicial notice operates authoritatively then. But this is
not an authority that need necessarily trouble us. Without question it is
an ultimately arbitrary authority in the sense that it is grounded in
nothing more metaphysically certain than a community of human beings
similarly trained into a language of social meanings. But the fact that
judicial notice is, at bedrock, arbitrary, does not mean that it is
necessarily a display of force or an exercise in tyranny.
The court's judgments about judicial notice may not be displays of
force, but displays of power or authority in the sense that Michael Walzer
" Davis, supra note 10 at 951.
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distinguishes between force and power. "Force," he remarks, "is power
used in violation of its social meaning." 49 The social meaning of the
court, I have suggested above, arises in a manner not very different from
the manner in which an expert acquires his or her authority. She acquires
it not through the democratic process, not because she articulates a
consensus or even represents a majority opinion in the community, but
because she is seen to have been obedient to the attitudes, choices,
preferences and forms of reasoning which currently and partially define
the practice of law. Having originally accepted the inadequacy of her
own performance as judged by those community standards she may excel
and generate, through diligence, devotion, and brilliance, one of those
formulations which become the best standards realized so far. In that
event the expert will speak superlatively for the community, not for him
or herself. This would be the authority of the court operating within its
social meaning. In all of the examples I have used about centipedic
horses and doubts about the existence of the world, Maclntyre's
comment that "A violation of the bonds of the community ... has to be
recognized for what it is by the community, if the community is not itself
to fail" is apt; and for a range of violations of social meanings the legally
trained judge is the one whom we have qualified to recognize and pass
judgment upon those violations.
This analysis is the first revision of the Thayer/Davis doctrine that I
wanted to argue. For there is room to recognize that the court must
operate with community judgments as a background or "form of life" for
its tableau of proofs on the foreground. Ordinarily this background is
taken-for-granted and is implicitly "noticed". This background is not
amenable to doubts without grounds. But a very significant doubt can be
raised by a group who argue that they do not share the similarities in
training which give the court its second nature and that the
misrecognition of this arbitrariness has led to an injustice. In general, the
court cannot be expected to notice its own misrecognition of
arbitrariness. Therefore that the court has 'taken notice' will be
something that arises on appeal or directly as an argument about how
forms of argument congenial to the court's way of doing things are
hostile to the very "form of life" of a particular community.
There is a further implication of this recognition that judicial notice
operates as a judgment authorized by the social meaning of the court and
that it is legitimately contested by alternative forms of life in the political
community with social meanings at variance with the court's. The court's
authority to discipline extends to expressions of idle doubt and utterances
49 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) at 282.
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of doubt for which causes and motives rather than reasons should be
sought. In the case of idle doubts and motivated utterances of doubt, the
criteria of elimination would be that the doubter is not responding to any
practice in which doubts might be rendered intelligible. They are a loose
cannon like the student who interrupts the history lesson with doubts
about whether the earth really existed. Because these doubts are hollow
does not entail that belief in history might be hollow. The party has not
learned what doubts count within the discipline of history.
Judicial notice as an exercise of authority grounded in social
meanings generated by the political community could have eliminated
Zundel's highly motivated - that is caused rather than grounded
speculations on this basis. 0 Charged with spreading false news by
publishing material that denied the existence of the Holocaust, Zundel
argued that the historical fact was not amenable to judicial notice - not
being, for him, a fact. The trial judge did not operate his discretion to
take notice, a judgment supported on appeal, arguing that the Holocaust
was, at least in this instance, a contentious historical fact which the
Crown had to demonstrate in proving that specific statements or
allegations in Zundel's publication were false. But the core contention
that excluded it from "what everybody knows" was the speculation of the
accused. By opening up a pivotal historical understanding of the 2 0 th
Century to proof and demonstration, a considerable load of the court's
socially constructed authority was lent to confirming the rational
legitimacy of Zundel's speculations, moving them from the realm of idle
and motivated assaults upon conventional wisdom. By refusing notice
the court was implicitly affirming the opposite: that the occurrence of the
Holocaust was open to a speculation which Canadian courts were
prepared to entertain, was not notoriously true and beyond dispute, and
that the reasonable person might be wiser to think twice. Zundel's
speculation became "one of the different and equally legitimate answers
which can be given to an explicit question."'51 It is not evident that the
political community gave the court this authority.
Another argument is available against Zundel's motivated
speculations from the "form of life" understanding of judicial notice. By
analogy with the Putnam examples, there are certain understandings of
the world upon which we will not allow experts to overrule us. Those are
the kinds of understandings upon which the very enterprise of the expert
is founded, understandings which, if undermined, should throw into
disarray the ordinary world of the political community through which all
disciplines acquire their authority. This is another sense of Maclntyre's
comment that "a violation of the bounds of the community ... has to be
50 R. v. Zundel (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 97 ; R. v. Zundel (1990) 53 CCC (3rd) 161.
s, Bourdieu, supra note 45 at 168.
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recognized for what it is by the community, if the community is not itself
to fail." The legitimate authority of the court is borrowed from its social
meaning, a meaning which, like the expert's testimony, is not self-made.
The fact that a democratic legislature has created legislation against hate
literature goes to evidence about the accepted social meanings that the
court is authorized to enforce, is evidence about the nature of the political
community that founds its authority. The court's failure to recognize the
violation of these ordinary bonds of the community - the ordinary
world of the political community from which the discipline of history
and law get their authority - was a failure of both the political
community and the court's authority. Had judicial notice been granted in
Zundel rather than proof been required in reliance upon the credibility of
expert testimony, this use would have been close to the Morgan doctrine
of the authoritative judge declaring indisputably that the fact of the
Holocaust was so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among
reasonable persons, declining to further grace an idle and motivated
speculation by responding to it with reasons certified by credible experts.
I draw these analogies between the Zundel case and the motivated
idle skeptic in order to distinguish them from the second way in which
the Davis/Thayer doctrine of judicial notice can be rescued from the
vacuity to which it is prey. The second way to rescue the doctrine is to
note that although idle doubts are eliminated and concomitant claims to
knowledge rendered senseless in the face of idle doubt, there are special
circumstances in which common sense might be open to doubt. In many
instances, nobody raises a question about the ordinary meaning of words
or whether rain runs downhill or whether there is sun in Ottawa at
midnight. No doubt has been raised, therefore these are the kinds of
statements in which first of all it is not unintelligible to claim that they
are "assumed" or that "everybody knows them to be true" in the same
way that Moore's utterance "I know that this is my hand" is without
meaning. Adding to their vacuity is the fact that no party has raised a
contingent doubt about them. They are doubly idle utterances upon
which the doctrine of judicial notice loses credibility if it claims to notice
them.
But the fact that in unspecified and general circumstances certain
propositions are meaningless and turn wheels idly does not mean that in
all circumstances they will be vacuous. This is the point of the argument
above that special circumstances might arise in which it makes sense to
both doubt and to claim to know things like that a car traveling eighty
miles per hour cannot stop within a distance of ten feet, that the gun is a
dangerous weapon, that a horse is a four-legged animal, and that the sun
does not shine at midnight in Ottawa. Those special circumstances would
be the ones to which a party in a dispute raises a doubt about common
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sense. The factual situation of one of the parties to the dispute gives rise
to doubts about common sense, ordinary usage, and what "everybody
knows". In this case, the facts in consideration are, to use Davis'
variable, close to the center of the controversy between the parties. It
would not be sufficient to raise these doubts by simply directing aimless
attacks at the infinity of things that are taken for granted if they are not
relevant to the parties at hand. They would only work on the adduction of
a very specific scenario. I would call these cases "special circumstance"
judicial notice to distinguish them from "form of life" judicial notice.
They merit different procedure and different analysis, the former calling
for explicit notice of prima facie evidence, the latter being implicit notice
amenable to dispute on the basis of contending loci of social meaning.
But if the reasons for doubting common sense are close to the center
of the controversy between the parties, then they are open for dispute. It
would make sense to treat the judgment implicit to judicial notice as
inconclusive prima facie evidence rather than to authoritatively foreclose
debate. This test of closeness to the center of controversy between the
parties is similar to the one that the court used in Zundel in refusing to
give judicial notice to the fact of the Holocaust. They used it erroneously,
in my opinion, for no remotely convincing counterfactual scenario was
presented which would have prompted the kind of judge whom we have
authorized to recognize violations of the community to have second
thoughts.
Judicial notice in "special circumstance" notice would play a role
very similar to that which Morgan advocated. Having heard contextual
arguments pleading against common sense that would ordinarily read
phrases like "guns are dangerous weapons" or "I know this is my hand"
to be empty and senseless, the judge could determine that the scenario
presented does not, in fact, raise sufficient grounds to give the scenario a
meaning. If, in the judgment of the judge, the special circumstances have
raised an idle or motivated doubt the judge is authorized, for the sake of
expediency, to scoop the contention out of the arena of proof and
disproof and immunize it from further dispute save those raised on
appeal.
Having drawn attention to a certain vacuity in the Thayer/Davis
doctrine, I have tried to rescue it by replacing "assumptions" and "that
which everybody knows" with the "form of life" in which law makes
sense. I have also tried to rescue the disputability of judicial notice that
Thayer and Davis wanted to retain by noting that those special
circumstances in which either one form of life contests another or in
which particular scenarios have arisen to throw common sense in doubt,
are precisely those in which the dispute is so close to the center of
controversy that it would defy natural justice if a mechanism were not
built into the machinery of law for these contentions to find a voice. With
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these revisions, I am now more equipped to inquire as to whether the
Thayer/Davis doctrine of judicial notice has received judicial notice in
Canadian law and whether the conventional wisdom upon which legal
commentators and judges ground their authority has come full circle
since Morgan wrote his treatise half a century ago and had his thinking
permeate the law.
Has Thayer's, Doctrine of Judicial Notice Received Judicial Notice?
On the Thayer doctrine of judicial notice, as developed by Davis,
Monahan and Walker, and L'Heureux-Dub6, judicial notice does not
operate in a significantly different way than stare decisis. Judicially
noticed facts are incorporated into the common law as law thereby
guiding future cases in requiring departures to be justified and also
thereby serving to consolidate the integrity of the legal system. As law,
judicially noticed facts are open to appeal where ordinary facts remain
within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. As law, they also
open the theory of sources up to extra-legislative and extra-judicial
sources of law. Diverse communities within the political community are
the sources of these judicially noticed legal facts which are certified by
experts who have qualified themselves to speak superlatively to
standards of excellence and accepted understandings of a community
pertinent to the dispute at hand. Judicially noticed facts serve as prima
facie evidence open to rebuttal by changes in community standards or
understandings on the judicially noticed facts, directly by dispute by one
of the parties to the litigation, and on appeal. With the qualifications I
have added concerning "form of life" judicial notice, noticed facts are
also amenable to dispute by communities contesting relevant forms of
life of the court at any level of the proceedings. With the qualification
that I have raised on the Davis/Thayer doctrine which eliminates vacuous
forms of notice, "taking judicial notice" implicitly should be retained as
part of the doctrine. Judicially noticed facts are not significantly different
from judgments and the authority for the court's judgments comes not
from democratic process but from the court continuing to exemplify the
social meaning which the political community attributes to the court in
the same manner as different communities do their experts. Is this
version of the doctrine conventionally wise? Is it good legal practice?
I will concede that the following argument is open to dispute but
will nonetheless lay out the prima facie evidence. The social meaning of
the court in Canada includes the presumption that judges act either as
authorities on the law (stare decisis) or are familiar with the most
authoritative sources of the law. L'Heureux-Dub6 in her office as
Supreme Court justice is in a position to make authoritative statements
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about the law. If her obiter on judicial notice were not obiter but were
ratio decidendi, the Moge decision on its own would have changed the
doctrine to accord with Monahan and Walker's analysis. As it is, her
obiter on the feminization of poverty has, in fact, been taken up by lower
courts and treated precedentially. The practice of lower courts has
incorporated the obiter into the common law, which, on the social
meaning of legal practice, it is qualified to do. In her office as a legal
commentator, enhanced by the authority of her Supreme Court office,
she stands as close to the pinnacle of making authoritative statements
about the law as Sopinka in his alternative textbook version of the
doctrine, versions that not only have been incorporated into Supreme
Court decisions but that also tacitly license the ability of legal
commentators to speak authoritatively about the law. L'Heureux-Dub6's
legal commentary consolidates the conventional wisdom of the
Thayer/Davis doctrine. Legal practice subsequent to Moge has further
incorporated the authority of her version by treating the feminization of
poverty as prima facie evidence, thereby consolidating the change in
conventional wisdom that her article tentatively, but boldly advanced.
These developments cannot be perceived, or assumed, or
acknowledged as acts of power used in violation of their social meaning
until non-idle, non-motivated reasons are advanced to raise a doubt.
Reasons that count would be responsive to the actual practice of law
within the Canadian political community. This implicit understanding of
the practice of the court is open to debate should a relevant
understanding of the political community, responsive to a compelling
counter-history or counter-tradition be advanced to provoke the practice
of law out of its taken-for-granted misrepresentations of its own
arbitrariness. Or it is open to debate should a diligent, devoted, and
perhaps brilliant expert arise whose formulation is judged to so well
encapsulate the tensions which reflect unarticulated agreements in
judgement in the community that it becomes the best standard realized so
far.
On the basis of these observations I would contend that the Thayer
doctrine has been incorporated into the common law as a guide to future
cases. This both puts the onus on future cases to justify their departures
and also serves to consolidate the integrity of the legal system. Judicial
notice, I would add, plays a critical and often implicit part in the form of
life that gives both the court and the legal system their social meaning.
I will coyly conclude by adding that if Thayer's doctrine of judicial
notice has been recognized in Canadian law and its renewed ascendancy
is the subject of ongoing debate about the nature and place of the
doctrine, then his sense that judicial notice is woven into the very texture
of legal reasoning will be confirmed, for the strength of that very texture
is bold but tentative claims to knowledge backed by similarities in
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training and open to persuasion and dispute. This, I will boldly and
tentatively assert, is the warrant that puts the doctrine of judicial notice at
the very beginning of a treatise on evidence as a clear and distinct
warning that it has a place wherever the process of reasoning has a place.
And that, as Thayer asserted, is everywhere - as we understand
everywhere to be.
Abstract
The doctrine of judicial notice has been gaining attention in Canadian
jurisprudence. This article begins with an examination of how the doctrine has
been recently used in areas such as family law to bring a diversity of community
interests into the legal decision-making process. The history of the doctrine in
American and Canadian jurisprudence is reviewed along with its principal
characterizations in the works of Thayer, Morgan, and Davis. The article goes
on to uncover several epistemological problems to which the doctrine is prone
and proposes a means of getting out of these philosophical dilemmas while
keeping the integrity of the doctrine intact. The article concludes by alluding to
the communitarian uses to which the doctrine might be put.
Rsum
La doctrine de la connaissance judiciaire attire de plus en plus d'attention dans
la jurisprudence canadienne. Cet article analyse d'abord comment ]a doctrine fut
utilisde dans des champs comme celui du droit de la famille pour introduire
divers intd6ts communautaires dans le processus de d6cision judiciaire.
L'histoire de la doctrine dans la jurisprudence amdricaine et canadienne est
revisitde par rapport aux principales lignes de pensde exprim6es dans les oeuvres
de Thayer, de Morgan et de Davis. L'article d6busque ensuite plusieurs
probl~mes dpist~mologiques auxquels la doctrine se prete et propose une voie
pour sortir de ces dilemmes philosophiques tout en prdservant son intdgritd. II
conclut en soulevant les utilisations communautaires possibles de cette doctrine.
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